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Irelands u m m a r y
This paper contributes theoretically and empirically to debates on the relationship between neoliberal-
ism and the institutionalization of the commons through an analysis of recent efforts to implement
community-managed lobster fisheries in Ireland. This initiative has been influenced by international
examples of co-management systems in small-scale, inshore fisheries, and is presented as a ‘‘third way”
for resource management, moving beyond the limited management choice of privatization or centralized
state control. The paper is based on interviews and fieldwork with the fisheries managers, scientists, and
inshore fishermen involved in the development of the co-management plan. In the paper, I use the ana-
lytic framework of governmentality to examine how these efforts to institutionalize the fisheries com-
mons represent both continuity and discontinuity with the long tradition of liberal thought and
biopolitical ‘‘improvement”. I argue that the continuity stems from the initial formulation of the problem
of overfishing as one of unregulated exploitation of a resource; the novelty lies in the critique of existing
institutional models, namely privatization and state regulation, that fail to adequately reflect and enable
the capacities of local communities to self-manage the resources they exploit. Understanding neoliberal
governmentality in terms of ‘‘improvement” helps us to understand and take more seriously the rationale
behind efforts to devise better institutional responses to the problem of overfishing. The concept of ‘‘im-
provement” helps to broaden the analysis of neoliberalism beyond an often narrowly defined focus on
market mechanisms and profit incentives; it shifts the focus of analysis away from the regulatory
moments of ‘‘enclosure” to the ongoing, often frustrated efforts to align fishers’ economic interests with
the ‘‘long-term” common good. The article argues for a more ambivalent reading of the commons that
places greater focus on how localized, collective action can be valued and incorporated within evolving
governmental and economic arrangements.
 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since the late 1970s, scholars and resource managers have been
promoting the commons as an alternative narrative and institu-
tional response to the dominance of neoliberal economic accounts
of environmental degradation. The re-valorization of the commons
as a complex and diverse set of norms and rules for managing
shared resources is set against the well-known and persistently
popular account of the ‘‘tragedy of the commons” (Dietz et al.,
2003). Coined by Garret Hardin in 1968, the tragedy narrative
reproduces a central tenet of liberal economic thought. In Hardin’s
account, individuals will continue to degrade common or shared
resources unless they are ‘coerced’ through state regulation or
incentivized through the allocation of private property rights
(Hardin, 1968). This interpretation of society-nature interaction
orientates around the assumed limits of (biophysical) nature and
(economic) man; effective management of common resourcesmust thus proceed in respect of these limits, even if this requires
the uneven allocation of rights: ‘‘injustice is preferable to ruin”,
as Hardin succinctly put it. In contrast, the promise and potential
of the commons lies in challenging the narrow economic self-
interest of individuals, and the narrow understanding of biophysi-
cal nature as a series of discrete, finite resources. Rather than dis-
missing the capacities of individuals to come together and
collectively manage shared resources as part of complex socio-
ecological systems, the re-valorization of the commons opens a
whole new field of inquiry, analysis, and institutional experimenta-
tion that targets these capacities.
Significantly, the potential benefits of collective action for
resource management have not been lost on the very institutions
and inheritors of the liberal tradition that many commons advo-
cates may have challenged in the past. As early as 1992, the World
Bank stated, ‘‘Governments need to recognise that smaller organi-
zational units, such as villages or pastoral associations, are better
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and may be a more effective basis for rural development and
rational resource management than institutions imposed from
the outside” (World Bank, 1992, p. 143).1 Support for community-
based resource management in the context of neoliberal re-
structuring, specifically the devolution of responsibility from more
centralized state institutions to individual citizens and communities,
has provoked critical scholars to question the extent to which local-
ized, commons-based forms of organization provide an alternative or
an extension of neoliberal rationalities (Bakker, 2008; De Angelis,
2013). One area that has been particularly rich for such debates is
fisheries management.
The problem of overfishing has been framed as a classic ‘‘tra-
gedy of the commons” since the 1950s, a decade or more before
Hardin coined the term (see Mansfield, 2004). Ostrom herself has
identified the problem of overfishing as resulting from a situation
of ‘‘open access” in which commercial fishermen are effectively
incentivized to overexploit fish stocks (Ostrom, 2000). As a result,
fisheries have been managed through both direct state regulation
and, more recently, the allocation of individualized, exclusive
rights of access (Crean & Symes, 1995), with the latter identified
as a classic form of neoliberal environmental governance: the
enclosure of the commons through the allocation of individualized
property rights (Mansfield, 2004; St. Martin, 2005). In the litera-
ture, both ‘top-down’ management and privatization have been
subjected to sustained critique (McCay, Creed, Finlayson, Apostle,
& Mikalsen, 1995; Ostrom, 2008), with community-based fisheries
management put forward as a ‘third way’ beyond these limited
management choices. Yet, critical scholars have examined how this
‘third way’ can continue to reproduce a defining feature of neolib-
eral fisheries management, namely the use of property regimes to
harness the profit-motive of individual fishers (Mansfield, 2007).
To disrupt the neoliberal fixation on property regimes and market
rationality, these scholars argue for closer attention to be paid to
the commons as a form of socio-ecological organization beyond
the reductive economic rationalities of neoliberalism and the accu-
mulation strategies of capital. This call to move beyond neoliberal
forms of fisheries management has frequently involved efforts to
map and foreground the social norms, community economies,
and ecologically attuned fishing practices that contribute to more
sustainable fisheries production, particularly in small-scale fish-
eries (St. Martin, 2000, 2009; Pinkerton, 2016; Pinkerton & Davis,
2015).
This paper contributes theoretically and empirically to debates
on the relationship between fisheries management, neoliberalism,
and the institutionalization of the commons. Using the analytic
framework of governmentality, I argue for a more dynamic under-
standing of neoliberalism as a reflexive form of governmental rea-
soning and practice that seeks to ‘‘improve” the health and security
of the population (Foucault, 2004; Li, 2007; Rose, 2006). In the con-
text of environmental governance, and sustainable development
more generally, a key locus of contemporary biopolitical ‘‘improve-
ment” has been the protection of natural resources and ecosys-
tems. It is the imperative to ensure the re/production of these
biophysical systems (for the common good) that today generates
diverse and novel forms of enclosure in the name of sustainability1 Perhaps most telling in this respect is the recognition that the work of Elinor
Ostrom, one of the best-known proponents of the commons, has received from libera
scholars. As Mark Pennington writes: ‘‘At the core of Ostrom’s work is the insight tha
many, though not all, of the free-rider and collective-good problems that are usually
presented as requiring external regulation may be better addressed by relying on the
ingenuity of those most affected by them to devise an appropriate set of rules. This is
an insight that is close to the heart of the classical liberal tradition and which ha
prompted a new generation of scholars to catalogue cases where we observe the formation
of rules without the exercise of external authority” (Pennington, 2012: 40–41; my
emphasis).
2 None of these fisheries managers and scientists lived in the commercial fishing
port where I was based for my fieldwork. The fieldwork drawn on for this article
involved traveling to the offices of these individuals which are scattered across
Ireland.l
t
s(not capital as such, even though new sites of commodification and
accumulation may be created). In the context of fisheries manage-
ment, this is manifest through various institutional, technical, and
market arrangements that require fishermen to demonstrate how
sustainable and efficient their fishing activity is even as they are
forced to compete in a global seafood market. Enclosure from this
perspective does not just refer to the implementation of individual,
private property rights over previously common resources (such as
the fisheries), but to any institutional boundary that excludes some
sections of the population from access to previously common
resources on the basis of bio-economic calculation i.e., the aligning
of economic interests, biophysical resources, and wider market
dynamics (Jeffrey et al., 2012). In this article, I focus on what I call
the logic of ‘‘improvement” to foreground the extended process of
neoliberal governmental reflection and knowledge production that
generates and justifies novel forms of enclosure in the fisheries.
Empirically, the paper is based on sixteen months of fieldwork
in Castletownbere, a commercial fishing port in the South West
of Ireland. This fieldwork was part of bigger research project exam-
ining transformations in the governance of the Irish and European
fisheries sector (see Bresnihan, 2016). Part of this fieldwork
focussed on the Irish inshore fisheries. This involved interviewing
and going fishing with over a dozen inshore fishermen, as well as
interviews with the key fisheries managers and fisheries scientists
working for over ten years on a plan to implement community-
managed lobster fisheries around the Irish coast.2 This initiative
began in the 1990s in response to declining numbers of lobsters,
the main commercial species for inshore fishermen. Inspired by
the example of the co-managed Maine lobster fisheries, lobster fish-
ermen, fisheries scientists, and fisheries managers sought to intro-
duce a similar framework for regulating access to the lobster
fisheries. Explicit from the start was a desire to avoid the potentially
negative social and economic consequences of individual transfer-
able rights of access, while at the same time ensuring some level
of security to enable more effective management of the lobster
stocks. As I show in section three of the paper, this approach to fish-
eries governance departs from other forms of neoliberal fisheries
management that have sought to harness the narrow, economic
self-interest of fishermen. A key insight put forward by my analysis
is that efforts to implement community-based fisheries manage-
ment in Ireland explicitly seek to incorporate (not exclude) the com-
plex socio- economic and ecological attributes of specific fisheries by
enabling fishermen to take on more of a role in the management of
the fish stocks they exploit. This is important because it complicates
the more familiar account of neoliberalism as a simplifying and/or
exclusionary form of power: neoliberalism does simplify and
exclude, but it also values and seeks to incorporate complexity.
The foregrounding of complexity and unpredictability in rela-
tion to environmental management has encouraged managerial
solutions that target the situated, responsive and collective capac-
ities of local communities. As I show in section three, fishermen
and their interactions with lobster, each other, the market, and
so on, are not just acted on, but are brought into the field of gov-
ernmental reflection and intervention: the transition from an
unregulated, relatively unknown (from the perspective of the
state) inshore fisheries sector, to a draft implementation plan that
has yet to be implemented, illustrates how the qualities and attri-
butes of both fishermen and fish stocks are actually generated
through the practice of government itself, namely the discursive
and material practices that map, measure and seek to arrange pro-
ductive relationships between fish stocks and fishing communities.
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changes in the conduct of fishermen, the way they relate to their
activity, environment, each other and the market. This represents
the extension of a modern biopolitics of improvement that ties
the health or re/productivity of the population to calculable forms
of knowledge (Bresnihan, 2016; Li, 2007). This perspective
becomes useful in understanding how the continued failure to
implement the lobster management plan is explained by either
the reluctance or inability of fishermen to commit to the ‘‘longer
term” sustainability of the marine environment, an explanation
that further incites efforts to create the conditions in which fisher-
men will be able to make such commitments. In the final section of
the paper, I describe this as the ‘‘(slow) tragedy of improvement”.
Understanding biopolitical improvement as part of a longer,
dynamic process of reflection on the failure of existing forms of
government (and the knowledge that underpins them) challenges
familiar readings of neoliberalism as a relatively fixed ideology ori-
entated around a narrow conception of the economic subject and
property rights.
2. Situating the commons
In her seminal text Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom
makes it clear where her motivation for researching the rules
and institutions of collective action lies: the power of certain dom-
inant narratives for explaining the causes of resource degradation
and the limited choice of management strategies that arise as a
result. For Ostrom and her colleagues, the ‘inevitability’ of the tra-
gedy was based on the inaccurate portrayal of resource users as
‘‘helpless individuals caught into an inexorable process of destroy-
ing their own resources” (Ostrom, 2008, 8). As Ostrom concludes, ‘‘
[a]s long as individuals are viewed as prisoners, policy prescrip-
tions will address this metaphor. I would rather address the ques-
tion of how to enhance the capabilities of those involved to change
the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other than
remorseless tragedies” (2008a, 7). By re-presenting individual
resource-users as deliberative agents capable of arriving at mutu-
ally agreed solutions to resource-based problems a whole new field
of inquiry into institutions for collective action is opened (Agrawal,
2003; Forsyth & Johnson, 2014). The focus of this inquiry has
tended to be on real-world settings where rules, norms, and
knowledge practices governing resource use and access have pro-
ven successful, often for centuries. As Forsyth and Johnson (2014)
argue, this ‘‘positive, rather than normative” approach to institu-
tions and their role in shaping social, political and economic life
has been central to the re-working of institutional approaches to
the commons.3 The emphasis on empirical case studies, a resistance
to ‘‘one-size-fits-all” solutions, and the goal of designing institutional
models that work ‘‘on the ground” in often messy, diverse contexts,
has appealed to resource managers frustrated with the apparent
inefficacy of existing institutional models, particularly in a context
of worsening problems of resource degradation (Acheson & McCay,
1990; Agrawal, 2003; Leach, 2008). Underlying critiques of existing
models of environmental management is a critique of the forms of
knowledge and analysis that guided such models, particularly the
capacity of top-down, scientific expertise to achieve effective man-
agement in diverse, complex and dynamic socio-ecological contexts
(Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2000; Berkes & Folke, 1998).
Critical scholars have pointed to the ways community-based
resource management can replicate and extend dominant neolib-
eral rationalities, rather than providing substantial alternatives.3 Governing the Commons, they write, was part of a highly influential series
published co-edited by James Alt and Douglas North, whose work on the institutional
foundations of economic and political life was highly influential in the American
social sciences (Forsyth & Johnson, 2014).By assuming that individuals will degrade and ultimately destroy
common resources unless subject to norms and regulation appears
to reproduce the basic assumption of the ‘‘tragedy of the com-
mons” narrative (De Angelis & Harvie, 2014; Goldman, 2001;
Turner, 2016). Empirically-informed analysis of the ambivalent
relationship between the commons and neoliberalism has been
particularly rich in the critical scholarship on contemporary fish-
eries management. The work of Becky Mansfield is particularly
instructive in this regard (2004, 2007). She traces the origins of
neoliberal approaches to fisheries management back to the 1950s
and the work of fisheries economists like Scott Gordon who
asserted that ‘‘[t]he fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman,
because there is no assurance that they will be there for him
tomorrow if they are left behind today” (Gordon, 1954, p. 125).
In Mansfield’s analysis, the persistence and continuity of the ‘tra-
gedy’ narrative provides a common point of departure for different
neoliberal property regimes (private, state, and community) that
all seek to regulate the economic self-interest of individual fisher-
men through the profit incentive. In this way, Mansfield makes a
distinction between common property regimes that reproduce
neoliberal assumptions and seek to harness market rationalities
to resolve problems of overfishing, and those that foreground
issues of social justice, equitable access, and social protection from
the market (2007).
Mansfield’s distinction between neoliberalism (privatization,
profit motive, market penetration), and neoliberalism’s ‘other’
(equitable access, social norms, market protections) resonates with
other critical scholarship on small-scale fisheries. Kevin St. Martin,
for example, writes, ‘‘[t]he assumed subject of fisheries (the utility
maximising competitive individual) and the space within which
that subject operates (the open access commons) have the effect
of erasing and/or displacing the cooperative and territorial prac-
tices of fishermen embedded within fishing communities” (2007,
543). In response to this ‘hegemonic’ neoliberal gaze, St. Martin
affirms the need to map and demonstrate the ‘otherness’ of the
fisheries commons as a ‘‘unique non-capitalist formation within
an economy conceptualized as diverse”, a practical and imagina-
tive departure from the cyclical processes of capitalist commodifi-
cation and neoliberal enclosure. Similarly, in a special issue edited
by Pinkerton and Davis on neoliberalism and fisheries manage-
ment in North America, there is a strong correlation made between
the neoliberal re-structuring of social and environmental relations
and the expansion of capitalist accumulation. Against this
dynamic, several papers argue that small-scale fisheries can pro-
vide a point of resistance in terms of the contributions they make
to public welfare, ‘‘by promoting more economically beneficial
equality and adapting to climate change and recession”
(Pinkerton & Davis, 2015, p. 310).
Critiques of neoliberal fisheries management thus tend to focus
on and challenge the reductive depiction of fishers as profit-
motivated economic agents and the negative social and economic
impacts of privatization (Barnett, Messenger, & Wiber, 2016;
Carothers, 2008). From this perspective, neoliberal fisheries man-
agement is taken to be ‘‘inflexible, maladaptive, and dictatorial,
and unable to take advantage of the substantial efficiency benefits
offered by small-scale fisheries” (Pinkerton & Davis, 2015, p. 309),
demonstrating a ‘‘disconnect that often occurs between neoliberal
policies and the local knowledge and practices that usually charac-
terize small-scale fisheries” (Pinkerton & Davis, 2015, p. 308).
Often aligned with a critique of capitalist accumulation, the litera-
ture also tends to identify how the extension of exclusive property
rights allows for the reproduction of capital, even going so far as to
suggest that neoliberal policies are implemented in service to cap-
italist interests (Pinkerton & Davis, 2015).
As I show in the next section, the fisheries managers and scien-
tists responsible for implementing co-management plans in the
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exclusive, individualized access rights, top-down knowledge, and
the dominance of extractive forms of capitalism. However, rather
than these positions representing a clear departure from neoliberal
approaches of the past I argue that they remain consistent with
basic aspects of neoliberal economic reasoning and governmental
practice. This is significant because it questions the extent to which
drawing clear distinctions between ‘neoliberal’ and ‘non-
neoliberal’ subjectivities and relationships is the best way to con-
ceptualize the relationship between the commons and neoliberal-
ism today. In order to tease out the continuities and discontinuities
between neoliberal forms of governance in the fisheries I now turn
to Foucault’s analytic framework of biopower/governmentality.
In the last of his 1976 lectures at the College de France and in
his book The History of Sexuality, Foucault introduced the concept
of biopower to describe a new form of power that emerged in
the latter half of the eighteenth century in Europe. Rather than a
power of ‘deduction’ (the legal deprivation of goods, products, ser-
vices, and, in extreme cases, life itself from political subjects), bio-
power was characterized by a logic of ‘production’, ‘‘a power bent
on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them,
rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit,
or destroying them” (Foucault, 1998, p. 136). Foucault describes
how the target of this new form of power is not a body of individ-
ual legal subjects, or bodies capable of ‘‘entrained performances”,
but a population, ‘‘a multiplicity of individuals who are and funda-
mentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the mate-
riality within which they live” (2004, 21). The challenge for the
State or Sovereign was how to govern this population, which con-
sisted of properties and dynamic relationships that were neither
entirely knowable nor amenable to control (Foucault, 2008). As
Foucault writes, ‘‘If one says to a population ‘do this,’ there is not
only no guarantee that it will do it, but also there is quite simply
no guarantee that it can do it” (Foucault, 2004, 71). The nature of
the population thus becomes a limit on power, something that
must be acknowledged and obeyed if government is to ensure
the ongoing health and security of the population.
It is in addressing the question of how to govern the population
that a new liberal ‘‘art of government” or governmentality, as Fou-
cault calls it, emerges. This form of governing is not concerned so
much with ‘‘imposing law on men but of disposing of things: that is
of employing tactics rather than laws, or even of using laws them-
selves as tactics—to arrange things in such a way that, through a
certain number of means, such-and-such ends may be achieved”
(Foucault, 1991, 95; emphasis added). To devise the most appro-
priate way of governing men and things, of arranging re/produc-
tive relationships between them, more precise knowledge about
their properties and the relationships between them is required.
This opens the space for a new productive relationship between
knowledge and power, that is, the techniques and technologies
for mapping, measuring, categorizing and, ultimately, representing
men and things are inseparable from the ways they are valued,
organized and ‘disposed of’. This new relationship between power
and knowledge generates what Foucault calls a ‘‘regime of truth”,
in which the ‘truth’ of ‘falsity’ of a government policy or interven-
tion is not located in an abstract, external system of transcenden-
tal value but in its measurable effects in the world. As Thomas
Lemke writes regarding governmentality as a new rationality of
power: ‘‘[t]he coordinates of governmental action are no longer
legitimacy or illegitimacy but success or failure” (Lemke, 2011,
46).
Scholars researching community-based resource management
and development since the 1990s have used the analytic frame-
work of governmentality to demonstrate how state projects enroll
local subjects and territories through techniques and technologiesof decentralized governance (Agrawal, 2006; Li, 2005; Lockie,
1999; Mosse, 1997). These analyses are helpful in demonstrating
how environmental projects are constructed over time through
the messy, sometimes contradictory, efforts of administrators, sci-
entists, civil servants, NGOs, and communities themselves. These
projects of improvement (Li, 2007) are understood as productive
of new subjects and environments, rather than simply negative
or exclusionary: the rolling out of development projects provides
opportunities for inclusion as well as exclusion. As Arun Agrawal
writes, ‘‘policies aiming at greater decentralisation and participa-
tion are about new technologies of government. To be successful,
they must redefine political relations, reconfigure institutional
arrangements, and transform environmental subjectivities”
(2006, 7). And while property regimes are a key part of this pro-
cess, they are part of a broader constellation of discursive and
material interventions that aim to foster new ways of perceiving,
valuing and interacting with the world (Dardot & Laval, 2014).
Understood from this perspective, neoliberalism is neither just
about the withdrawal of the state or the advance of the market,
but ‘‘an opportunity to rearrange the ways in which rule is accom-
plished, while also offering communities an opportunity to realign
their position within (but not outside) the state system” (Li, 2002,
p. 278).
A more recent body of Foucauldian scholarship (Braun, 2015;
Reid, 2013; Mezzadra, Reid, & Samaddar, 2013) argues that a shift
in the focus of biopolitical regulation has been occurring since the
1970s that helps explain the foregrounding of local community
capacities and knowledge. While environmental factors were
always part of efforts to manage the population (and thus subject
to mapping, measurement and management) throughout the 19th
and 20th centuries, this was only in so far as they supported the
health and well-being of the human population. Since the 1970s,
however, the environment has ceased being simply a backdrop/
resource for human economic activity, becoming instead a vital
and complex support system on which all other activities depend
(Braun, 2015; Nelson, 2015). Generic concepts such as ‘sustainable
development’ thus indicate a fundamental shift in the focus of
development, ‘‘not simply from the economy to a wider under-
standing of human well-being, but from the development of
human life to the non-human ‘‘life support systems” which peoples
are said to depend on in order to live well and prosper” (Reid, 2013,
p. 354). This historic shift is important for understanding changes
within environmental governance, particularly the valorization of
local forms of knowledge and resilience in a context of growing
ecological risk and complexity (Joseph, 2013; Vardy & Smith,
2017); as Pugh (2014) asserts, ‘‘changing understandings of the
environment matter because [they] work to change the stakes of
governmental rationalities and practices”.
The tendency toward prioritizing the biological sustainability of
fish stocks within fisheries management is clear in the case of
European fisheries policy. The most recent reform of the European
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2013 established for the first
time in its thirty-year history a strategy to manage the fisheries
from the perspective of the biological health of the fish stocks
(rather than the economic expansion of the fishing industry). Prior-
itizing the biological performance of fish stocks establishes a ‘‘com-
mon” (measurable) goal for fisheries managers, scientists, citizens,
and the fishing industry to work toward. These developments have
prompted far-reaching and critical reflections on the structural
failings of existing fisheries management and the need for radical
changes in how the problem of overfishing is understood and what
new approaches are required (Bresnihan, 2016). Incorporating the
fishing industry as an active participant in the management of fish
stocks (rather than simply an economic exploiter of fish stocks) is
identified as necessary for achieving sustainable fisheries
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fisheries governance this means re-scaling roles and responsibili-
ties ‘‘down” to the fishers: ‘‘[s]o, we need to enhance the aspect
of de-centralized decision-making”, former EU Commissioner for
Fisheries, Maria Damanaki, stated, ‘‘[i]ssues that are merely techni-
cal do not belong to the political level” (Damanaki, 2011, p. 2). This
neoliberal discourse of decentralized governance is giving rise to
diverse institutional, legislative, technical and market arrange-
ments that aim to address the ‘‘common” problem of depleting fish
stocks. It is in the light of these on-going debates and experiments
that attempts to institutionalize community-based management in
the Irish inshore fisheries needs to be situated.8 The ‘naturalization’ of the complex problem of resource depletion has been a
erennial target for political ecologists, anthropologists, and sociologists since Marx’s
athing attacks of Malthus and liberal political economy. As Lyla Mehta, one of the3. Governing better
Historically, inshore fisheries have been the social and eco-
nomic mainstay of small coastal communities in Ireland.4 The main
species targeted are crab, lobster, scallops, prawns and, to a lesser
degree, assorted flatfish. The most valuable inshore species in terms
of earnings is the lobster. Compared to the offshore fishing industry,
the inshore sector has not experienced rapid technological advances
or overcapitalization in terms of expanded fishing capacity. And
while inshore fish stocks have declined over the past few decades,
they are not under the same kind of pressure as offshore fish stocks.
Consequently, the inshore sector is often described in policy docu-
ments as ‘‘traditional” or ‘‘artisanal.”
In 1994, regional lobster fishing associations and co-operatives
first formed around Ireland under the umbrella of the Irish Lobster
Association (ILA). During the sixteen months of fieldwork I carried
out in Castletownbere, one of the largest commercial fishing ports
in Ireland, I got to know one of the leading figures in the ILA, a fish-
erman named Tom O’Sullivan.5 He told me about a visit he and
other representatives made to Maine in 1994. They had been invited
by the Maine Lobster Association (MLA), which was successfully
moving at that time toward a form of co-managed lobster fisheries
that would ensure that the lobster fishermen had direct control over
their fishing activity. Inspired by the example of the Maine lobster
fisheries and mobilized by the partial success of recent collective
actions, several groups of inshore fishermen in Ireland, mostly from
the south coast, began pushing for the introduction of statutory reg-
ulations on fishing and some form of community-managed lobster
fishery framework.
Maeve O’Reilly (fisheries manager with Bord Iaschaigh Mhara6
[BIM]), James Carney (fisheries scientist with the Marine Institute7),
and Brid Smith (civil servant in the Department of Agriculture, Mar-
ine and Fisheries) are three individuals who were centrally involved
in the development and design of a community-based strategy for
managing the Irish lobster fisheries. Along with Tom O’Sullivan, all
three believed that the main problem with the decline in lobster
stocks was the lack of regulation governing the inshore fisheries.
‘‘Well I think if I was a lobster fisherman at the moment, irrespective4 The inshore sector describes a territorial area as well as a type of fishing: the
inshore extends out six nautical miles from the national coast of each European
member state and refers to vessels of less than 12 m. In Ireland the inshore sector
accounts for about half of all those employed in the fishing industry and over three
quarters of the vessels in the fishing fleet. Figures from 2007 show that the inshore
sector accounted for 1,400 of the 1,800 vessels in the entire fleet. The inshore sector
employs about 2,300 fishermen out of a total of 4,900 in the entire sector. Despite
making up such a large proportion of the fleet and fishermen, the inshore sector only
lands 20% of the total catch-value of the Irish fisheries (Bord Iascaigh Mhara,
Managing Access to the Irish Lobster Fishery).
5 All names of respondents have been changed to protect their anonymity.
6 The state agency with responsibility for developing the fishing industry.
7 The national body responsible for undertaking, coordinating and promoting
marine research in Ireland.of how much I want to see the long term, I don’t think I could act in
the long term,” Carney told me. ‘‘I couldn’t be proactive because the
management system doesn’t allow me to. It effectively forces me into a
short-term view. So that has to change certainly” (2009; my empha-
sis). He went on: ‘‘If you look at the problem with the lobster fishery
at the moment, it’s not due to bureaucracy, it’s due to a lack of
bureaucracy, a lack of collective action and talking” (Damanaki,
2011). Maeve O’Reilly echoed this point, identifying the underlying
conflict between the ‘‘short-term” actions of fishermen operating
in an unregulated fishery, and the need for the ‘‘long-term” sustain-
ability of the fisheries. The challenge for her and other fisheries man-
agers, scientists, and fishermen, was in aligning the interests, and
thus actions, of individual fishermen with the long term ‘‘common”
good of sustainable fisheries.
Tracing the cause of overfishing to the unregulated activity of
individual fishermen exploiting limited natural resources is where
institutional approaches to the commons and the long tradition of
liberal thought coincide. At the same time, however, the fisheries
managers and scientists involved also understand that inshore
fishers are not inherently self-interested or driven by the pursuit
of profit. After all, the initial impetus for managed access to the
fisheries came from the lobster fishers’ organizations themselves.
Unlike more familiar depictions of neoliberal responses to over-
fishing that emphasize ‘simplistic’ solutions that orientate around
the need to limit the activities of fishermen (private rights of access
or top-down state regulation), the position of the fisheries man-
agers and scientists is that inshore fishermen need to be enabled
to better manage their own resources. The positive rationale
behind institutions for collective action is that fishermen can and
should be supported to take collective decisions and actions that
benefit themselves and the fish stocks they exploit.8 It is in seeking
to devise better ways of governing the ‘‘unregulated” commons that
the novelty of institutions for collective action lies. As the example
of the Irish inshore fisheries demonstrates, seemingly benign efforts
to ‘‘improve” the management of the fisheries commons can create
novel forms of enclosure.
In the case of the Irish inshore fisheries (and inshore fisheries
globally), top-down state regulation, or ‘‘management by centre”
as Brid Smith (2009) called it, has never been a desirable or feasible
option. Historically, the alternative to direct state management of
fisheries has been the allocation of exclusive, individual and trans-
ferable rights of access (Crean & Symes, 1995). However, in the
case of the Irish inshore fisheries, fisheries managers, scientists,
and the associations of inshore fishermen were unified in wanting
to avoid transferable rights of access primarily because of socialremost scholars on the politics of scarcity, summarizes in the introduction to an
dited collected on ‘the limits to scarcity’: ‘‘‘scarcity’ has emerged as a totalizing
iscourse in both the North and the South with science and technology often
xpected to provide solutions, but such expectations embody a multitude of
nexamined assumptions about the nature of the ‘problem’, about the technologies
nd about the so-called institutional fixes that are put forward as the ‘solutions’”
013: 2). Underlying assumptions about the ‘nature’ of scarcity, she goes on,
enerate ‘simplistic’ and often inappropriate solutions that re/produce new forms of
xclusion. While broadly in agreement with the critical impetus of this argument, it is
e contention of this article that the ‘solutions’ that are generated in response to the
roblem’ of resource depletion are not simplistic. From the analytic perspective of
overnmentality, the solutions that are generated in response to problems like
verfishing are not plucked out of thin air (according to some ideological conviction),
ut emerge out of a longer process that incorporates techno-scientific work (mapping,
easuring, gathering data), property rights and other legal instruments, and market
evices, that are coordinated to bring about effects that come to be seen as necessary



















P. Bresnihan /World Development 120 (2019) 210–220 215equity concerns.9 Both Maeve O’Reilly and James Carney identified
the risk of ‘‘aggregation” (concentration of the resource in few
hands), quoting the example of the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery
where Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) had created monopolies
within fisheries that had previously supplied an ‘‘expanded social
benefit”. As Carney summarized: ‘‘[t]he one thing we’re saying with
the lobster is you can have an exclusive right, but not a transferable
right—that’s the difference with ITQ. That will enable the long-term
view without creating this great cost for the next generation who
want to get into the fishery”. This socially oriented commitment to
avoiding ITQs was also combined with a belief that community-
based fisheries management provided other benefits, such as collec-
tive responsibility and action, that would contribute to the overall
aim of achieving sustainable fisheries.
The initial challenge to introducing a co-management frame-
work for the Irish inshore fisheries was the lack of knowledge
about the fisheries. As James Carney told me: ‘‘If you look at atten-
tion paid to it [lobster fisheries] prior to 2000, it was almost zero. I
don’t think there was a scientific paper published between 1963
and 1995, or a policy paper. So it’s a blank sheet from the state’s
point of view” (2009). In response, BIM began identifying the num-
bers of fishermen and vessels operating in the inshore sector as a
first step toward designing a management plan (BIM, 1999). They
soon discovered that half the boats operating commercially were
not even licensed. Many of the smaller fishermen had not bothered
to sign up because, as one fisheries manager told me, ‘‘the idea of
bothering to license his boat was just mad”. Many of these boats
were just small punts with an outboard motor, and anyone who
lived by the coast and wanted to catch a few crab or lobsters on
the side could do so. The licensing of all active fishing boats was
understood to be a necessary step toward the implementation of
a management structure for the inshore fishery.
Additional knowledge about the different species targeted,
catch levels, the distribution of fishermen between fishing ports,
and the fishing grounds they used, were also incorporated into
the design of the management framework. These data were
gathered through industry-science initiatives which encouraged
lobster fishermen to monitor their own fishing activity, recording
where and what they caught, as well as nation-wide consultations
with representatives from local inshore fisheries advisory commit-
tees set up as part of the process. For Carney, the fisheries
managers, and the inshore fishermen actively involved in consulta-9 The wider debate over the relative merits of ITQs as a fisheries management too
for the European fisheries is not directly related to the inshore fisheries but helps
illustrate how neoliberal policies should not simply be caricatured as ‘ideological
givens. The more salient point is that the debates around ITQs are not qualitatively
different from those involving community-managed fisheries i.e., it is not whether
ITQs are good or bad in principle (i.e., market price is the best way to allocate
resources) but what the potential impacts may be on specific fisheries in relation to a
whole series of concerns (e.g., will quotas be more enforceable, will fish populations
benefit, will fishing capacity be reduced, will the value of the fisheries be
monopolized), and how potentially negative impacts can be ameliorated e.g., through
limits on the trade of quotas. In Ireland, for example, ITQs have not been implemented
because of the potentially negative social and economic impacts it may have on a
fishing industry that is still relatively under-capitalized, community-based and
consisting of trawlers that are owner-operated (rather than the vertically integrated
fishing companies in countries like Spain and the Netherlands). A good example o
this pragmatic (neoliberal) approach to ITQs comes in the form of a report on ITQs by
the Canadian NGO, EcoTrust. The report emphasizes the potential efficacy of ITQs as
part of a ‘‘holistic” form of fisheries management. While the report offers a critica
account of the negative social and ecological consequences of ITQs in the salmon
fisheries in British Columbia, it concludes that ITQs are not in themselves the
problem: ‘‘[d]ebate about TQs is often polarized and fueled more by ideology than
reality. . .. Downplayed is the critical role that sound science and good governance—
that is, inclusive, transparent co-management between government, and industry and
stakeholders—play in ensuring the sustainability of fisheries. The central lesson of this
brief investigation into ITQs is that there are no simple solutions or quick fixes to
fisheries conservation. If properly designed, ITQ systems can play an effective role in a
multi-faceted approach to responsibly managing fisheries” (EcoTrust, 2009, p. 1).l
’
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ltions on the fisheries management plan, these data were necessary
to determine the most appropriate scale for the territorial units
that would form the basis of the management plan. As Carney
put it: ‘‘to establish at what scale will the fishermen and the lob-
sters be enabled to organize and engage in productive relations
with each other?”.
This goes some way to explain why it was not until 2008, more
than a decade after Tom’s visit to Maine, that BIM published a con-
sultation document for the lobster fisheries.Managing Access to the
Irish Lobster Fishery (BIM, 2008) provided the basic outline for a
management plan for the lobster fishery and offered a blueprint
for the management of other inshore fish species. The Irish coast
was to be divided into eight zones or territories. Each of these
zones was to be broken into two additional units to allow more
flexibility for those fishermen who were working on the boundary
between two units. While the Irish lobster fishery has nothing like
the well-developed territories and ‘‘gangs” of the Maine lobster
fishery, the decision to create localized zones was based on the
need to create a sense of ownership among small communities of
fishermen over particular lobster stocks.
The significance of the proposed plan was that for the first time
a form of regulated access to the lobster fishery would be legislated
for and enforced by the state. Fishermen who currently had a
license to fish for lobster would be issued an authorization that
would allow them to fish for lobster within their zone. There was
a limit placed on the number of authorizations issued. These
authorizations could not be bought or sold and thus did not func-
tion as a tradable right of access. There were no criteria set for how
many pots a fisherman could set, but the expectation was that the
security promised by the limited entry for fishermen and the scale
of the fishing zones would foster collaboration and collective deci-
sion making in the management of the fish stocks. As Carney put it,
The setting up of management units, limited access, and man-
aged entry to those units is the first basic step to address the
sustainability issue. Now you have managed access, when you
have managed access the group can collectively act. They may
wish to reduce effort at a certain rate, to improve the cost ben-
efit. So it gives them scope for more action essentially. . ..
[(my emphasis)]Rather than instituting individualized, private access rights as a
means of inciting competition between individuals, the institu-
tional approach to the commons seeks to enable cooperation
between fishermen by defining collective access rights over fish-
eries. Referring to the creation of territorial units, O’Reilly
described this as an important step toward the fostering of a ‘‘so-
cial infrastructure” that would provide the basis for achieving the
goals of sustainable development—in terms of the biological sus-
tainability of the fish stocks, economic viability, and social inclu-
sion. Underlying this was a recognition that fishermen are
socially embedded, innovative, and knowledgeable of their own
environments, properties that can enable local actors to ‘do it bet-
ter’ than can be done through the unmediated imposition of regu-
latory schemes (Van der Ploeg, 2009).
James Carney explained how important changes in fisheries
science since the 1990s were promoting more collaborative
approaches to fisheries management. He related the experience
of the Maine lobster fishery as a turning point in this regard. Up
until the early 1990s, marine scientists in Maine had been using
a recruit model as a means of understanding the population
dynamics of the lobster fisheries. A recruit model compares the
number of new eggs produced in a year with the number of fish
caught in the same period. Because the levels of egg production
were very low, the prediction models suggested that the stock
was about to collapse. But it didn’t even though the Maine lobster
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lobsters. This was a complete contradiction of the science, which
in turn undermined the credibility of the scientists and the recom-
mendations that they called for. With the support of some marine
biologists and researchers, the lobster industry argued that this
apparent anomaly—high catch rates and high lobster popula-
tions—owed partly to how fishermen managed access to the fish-
ery and the fishing activity itself (Acheson, 2003).10 When the
scientists finally took a step back and consulted the fishermen the
result, Carney told me, was ‘‘like a chain being removed, all of these
new ideas came forward, new models, new data provision, better
indicators, more cooperation because the fishermen didn’t feel
threatened anymore” (2009; emphasis added).
Carney recounted this experience to explain that the main prob-
lem facing the Maine lobster fisheries in the 1980s was not a dis-
agreement over the data being collected but the model of science
itself. The recruit model assumed that fish stocks were discrete,
quantifiable resources that were only affected by levels of exploita-
tion by fishermen. This model failed to account for the inherent
unpredictability of fish population dynamics and the potentially
beneficial fishing practices and knowledge employed by fishermen.
Responding to these capacities, the new model of fisheries man-
agement thus entails a clear departure from previous models that
sought to base decisions on scientific certainty and the imposition
of clear limits (i.e., quotas) on fishing activity. This new model is
now not only being applied to small-scale fisheries, such as the
lobster fisheries, but fisheries management more generally. As Car-
ney told me:
In the case of lobster, we haven’t gone down the road of trying
to assess population abundance really, or even in making fore-
casts about abundance, or future catches and future population
sizes. . .. There’s a move away from using those predictive mod-
els to using what we would call just simple indicators of the
current status of the stocks. So rather than having an absolute
estimation of something, you have a relative indicator. So you’re
looking for trends over a period of time rather than absolute
point estimates at particular points in time. So they are different
scientific approaches. The scientific approach and the certainty
with which scientists can make an estimate is also related to,
and in some way defines, the way the management system
works. . . hence the move toward the more co-management
model rather than a top-down situation. So I think it’s important
that the scientific work which is traditionally seen as the starting
point is now seen as one seat at the table, and can give its opinion,
and is only one opinion. That is where we are at the moment I
think.
[(emphasis added)]
According to Carney, any ‘workable’ management system had to
incorporate uncertainty and flexibility, reflecting the complex bio-
logical, social, and economic dynamics of the fisheries. Carney
describes here a process rather than a singular regulatory event
or shift in how the fisheries are managed: ‘‘relative indicators”
trace patterns and tendencies over time that allow fisheries scien-
tists, managers, and fishermen themselves to identify whether cer-
tain actions are effective vis-à-vis the measurable bio-economic
performance of the fishery. As one of the BIM consultation docu-
ments put it, the co-managed approach is a ‘‘form of experimental
adaptive management [that] is highly suited to stocks which are
structured geographically, and where the relative effects of fishing10 Acheson argues that the tendency of the Maine lobster fishermen to adopt
practices that regulate how fishing is done, rather than simply regulating how many
fish are caught, appears around the world in small-scale fisheries. ‘‘These rules are
unusual in that they are designed to maintain critical life processes,” Acheson writes
(2003, 228; emphasis added).and environment on catch rates are unknown” (Tully, 2004, p. 4;
emphasis added). Replacing the hierarchy of scientific expertise,
awareness of the uncertainty and dynamism of marine ecosystems
is resulting in the demand for more grounded, co-produced and
flexible forms of decision-making that are assessed by their effi-
cacy vis-à-vis specified and measurable goals, rather than abstract
claims to universal validity (see Forsyth, 2003; Pellizzoni, 1999).
Working to improve the performance of simple indicators, such
as the status of the lobster stock in an area, thus provides a com-
mon, measurable point around which fishermen, scientists, and
fisheries managers can come together to devise localized, experi-
mental and technical solutions to the problem of overfishing.4. The (slow) tragedy of improvement
While Irish lobster associations have been making proposals for
some form of managed access to the lobster fisheries since the
early 1990s, and a management plan reflecting these demands
was published in 2008, nothing has yet been implemented.
O’Reilly, who has been involved in fisheries management since
the late 1990s, was clearly frustrated: ‘‘Here we are at the end of
ten years and we don’t have a lobster management plan. After all
those initiations and iterations of a process that you had fishermen
involved in, for the right reasons if you like, in terms of sustainabil-
ity, viability, both economic and biological” (2009).
The situation suddenly changed in 2012 because of Ireland’s
commitment to European biodiversity directives. Under the EU
Birds and Habitats Directive (2001), a network of nature conserva-
tion sites known as Natura 2000 sites were established around Ire-
land, including in many coastal areas. These conservation areas
required the Irish government to collect biological baseline data
through its conservation agency, the National Parks and Wildlife
Service (NPWS). In 2007, the EU Commission brought five com-
plaints against the Irish government for failing to adequately clas-
sify or protect several important areas. The EU threatened heavy
fines unless the Irish government complied with the directive. Pre-
viously peripheral areas along the coast suddenly became a prior-
ity for the state. The reforms mandated assessments of all licensed
activities, including fishing, taking place within these designated
areas to make sure they did not adversely affect key species. The
need to demonstrate that fishing was being carried out sustainably
gave a new impetus to the lobster co-management framework.
O’Reilly said that lobster fishermen ‘‘will now do anything to be
involved” because of the threat of the European directives (and
potential exclusion from the fisheries entirely). Although most
inshore fishermen do not have a significant impact on biodiversity
within coastal environments, the directive would require them to
demonstrate this through management plans and evidence of fish-
ing impacts. While O’Reilly was disappointed that it took this kind
of regulatory pressure to galvanize fishermen and the Irish Govern-
ment into acting on the management plan she welcomed the pos-
itive effects it was having.
In the end, the threat of European sanctions for noncompliance
with Natura 2000 did not materialize, and the plans to manage
access to the lobster fishery were put on hold. In a subsequent
email exchange in 2014, O’Reilly told me that the management
plan had come to a standstill again partly because of government
‘‘foot-dragging,” but mostly because of the ‘‘short-term” attitude
and lack of support for managed access of lobster fishermen them-
selves. When I pushed her to specify who these fishermen were or
why they were against a system of managed access, she told me
they were the established, full-time lobster fishermen with polyva-
lent licenses (access to both non-quota shellfish and quota fin-
fish)—those who were, ‘‘ironically”, most dependent on the
health of the fish stocks. Among other concerns, these fishermen
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value of their tonnage.11 O’Reilly told me that a biologically well-
managed fishery should outweigh the asset value of an individual’s
tonnage. The lack of support from these established inshore fisher-
men was, for her, a good example of how ‘‘short-term” self-
interest continued to trump collective actions for the ‘‘long term”
good. For O’Reilly, this lack of progress on the implementation of
the co-managed inshore fisheries was clearly frustrating. This frus-
tration was in part directed at the lack of departmental support to
drive the issue, and in part at the fishermen themselves whose initial
enthusiasm for such a scheme appeared to have waned.
I went fishing several times with Joe, a young, full-time lobster
fisherman who had been involved in the initial consultations on
the inshore co-management plan. He understood the need for
some sort of regulation but was wary of the proposed licensing
system. To begin with it did not differentiate between different
kinds of fishermen. The government’s decision in the early 2000s
to grant a free potting license to all inshore boats had effectively
granted a green light to anyone with a boat to target crab and lob-
ster. But these part-time fishermen often had other sources of
income and thus didn’t rely on the fishing. In Joe’s words, ‘‘they
didn’t care for the fish”, meaning they fished too many pots, or left
their pots down for too long because they forgot about them. There
are currently no formal rules about these things but because Joe
relied on the lobsters coming back each year he, and other full-
time fishermen, had to recognize these limits in the areas where
they fished; the decisions Joe makes on an everyday basis do not
entirely begin and end with him. He does strategize to make a liv-
ing, but he is also embedded within social and ecological contexts
and relationships that are negotiated on an ongoing basis. For
example, Joe relies on other fishermen whom he knows personally.
He relies on them not to overfish the stock, or to fish pots across his
own, but he may also rely on them for a loan of fishing gear if his
own breaks down, to help him on the boat at short notice, or to
share knowledge about where fishing may be good. It is hard to
pinpoint or explain this kind of ethos, one that does not simply ori-
entate around the exploitation or management of a resource but
the more complex sharing of an ill-defined territory consisting of
multiple resources.12 This locally situated but widely distributed
economy of exchange and reciprocity does not neatly fit within a for-
mal institutional model. Importantly, this is not lost on the fisheries
scientists and managers involved in the management of the inshore
fisheries. They spoke about the extent of ‘‘good-will” and the ‘‘con-
servationist ethos” that existed among inshore fishermen. The chal-
lenge was in creating the appropriate institutional parameters that
would encourage and enable these qualities to come to the fore.
To date this had not been successful, which for Joe related to the sec-
ond, arguably more significant limitation of the co-management
plan.
This main criticism that Joe had of the proposed licensing sys-
tem was that it did not address the declining price of fish. Inshore
fishing was hardly viable anymore according to Joe. It did not mat-
ter how healthy or how well regulated the stock was—a fisherman
could not survive off his income. At the time, the price of lobster
was €9.50/kg instead of €13/kg the year before, and brown crab11 Tonnage represents the share of the quota allocated to a particular boat: the
larger the tonnage the higher proportion of the allocated quota a boat will receive
Tonnage can be sold between boats, but unlike tradable quotas, the transfer o
tonnage tends to be a one-time event, usually when a fisherman leaves the fishery. In
the absence of a decent pension, fishermen commonly see tonnage as a capital asse
that can be realized when they retire from fishing. The reason why polyvalent license-
holders in the inshore fisheries opposed any system of managed access to the lobster
fishery was that any limits on who can come in and out of the fishing zones would
effectively mean a reduced market for their tonnage.
12 I have discussed in more detail this vision of the ‘‘more-the-human commons”
elsewhere (See Bresnihan, 2015).
13 Bird Rose describes something similar when she writes how a white settler
regards his relationship to the place he lives and works as ‘‘spiritual.” He understands
the place, Nature, as an ‘‘active force, something living, something to be encountered,”
even though he is also involved in economic practices that have undermined and
destroyed it (Rose, 2004). Although fishermen are the primary exploiters of the
fisheries, their relations to the marine environment are, to different degrees, more
complex than this narrowly economic one. Although fishermen are inserted within
circuits of production and accumulation, they are also part of everyday nature-
cultures that have escaped the enclosure and separation of modern space and time.
14 This attitude was also widely shared by the fishermen I worked with during my
fieldwork..
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twas €1/kg rather than €3/kg. While prices fluctuated, Joe could only
see things getting worse as buyers and middlemen dominated the
European market. This effected Joe’s fishing practices directly,
eroding his ability to ‘‘care” for the fish that he caught. The first
day I went potting with Joe, the processing factory had told him
they were not accepting the bodies of crabs because they could
not sell them. The processing factory had been in decline, and Joe
was worried he would have nowhere to sell his catch. He had no
choice but to rip the claws off all the crabs—maybe two to three
hundred. It is illegal to rip both claws off the crab because without
them they have no way of hunting, essentially ensuring they die.
Joe was also aware of how painful it must be for the animal. Joe
knew all this but had no choice. Not only did he run the risk of a
fine and a criminal record if he was caught, but he also thought
it was a ‘‘terrible waste of good meat.” The more that Joe is exposed
to the vagaries of the uneven seafood market, the less possible it is
for him to care for the fisheries (and community) he relies on.13 The
pressure to align one’s activities—from ripping off crab claws to
increasing the number of pots fished—to the demands of the market
is identified as the main driver of depleting fish stocks, not the lack
of formal institutions and allocation of access rights.
When asked about the economic pressures facing lobster fisher-
men, O’Reilly accepted that these were real but that the only real-
istic way of combatting this situation was through concentrating
on what fishermen could control, namely working together with
other fishermen and fisheries managers to ensure the fish stocks
they relied on were performing well, thereby enhancing their eco-
nomic viability. For O’Reilly, the challenge was to move beyond
what she described as ‘‘grumbling” about fish prices, which are
‘‘beyond the control” of fishermen, to more positive action directed
toward aspects of their activity they can influence: ‘‘All you want
to do is say, ‘This is the area you mainly fish in, you get to decide
how many pots should be fished in that area including yourself.’
It’s not about limiting you as much as saying address the issues in this
area, concentrate your thing here, what do you want, what are your
targets, do you want to increase catch rate and so on” (2009; empha-
sis added). Brid Smith also acknowledged that fishermen wanted a
higher price for their catch but believed that such aspirations were
unrealistic in what she called the ‘‘world economic climate”.14 She
also sought to emphasize the positive ways local fishermen could
respond to this situation by collectively managing fish stocks to
ensure sustainable fish stocks and sustainable livelihoods.
O’Reilly and Smith were not unaware of the economic pressures
and competition inshore fishermen faced. But they emphasized
that fishermen were not ‘‘helpless”, that there were things they
could do to improve their economic viability. This depended on
them working together in a regulated fishery. While they were
frustrated and disappointed about the failure of the management
plan (to date), they believed the only answer was to continue
working through the various ‘‘obstacles” that were arising, by
working harder to bring fishermen together, inform them about
the long-term benefits of collectively managing their fisheries
and enabling them to do that through institutional interventions
and supports. This was articulated by Brid Smith as a commitment
to ‘‘getting things right on the ground”: ‘‘[i]nternational experience
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cess, just keep going back and back until you are driven demented
by the whole process”. To reinforce her point, Smith described a
recent development with crab fishermen on the West coast. These
fishermen had approached BIM looking to gain environmental
accreditation for their crab. Accreditation is a market-based instru-
ment that promises to reward sustainable fishing practices
through the added-value accredited fish products gain at the point
of sale (Foley & McCay, 2014). While there are many types of
accreditation scheme for the fisheries a basic requirement is the
ability to demarcate the fishery and the fishermen participating
in the accreditation scheme. Beyond this, fishermen must also be
able to monitor the fish stocks, enforce regulations, and ultimately
comply with the criteria for the specific accreditation scheme. For
Smith, this was an example of how fishermen taking the initiative
to market their catch could drive plans for the co-management of
the inshore fisheries, and vice versa. The point was that marketing
opportunities like eco-labels could encourage fishermen to work
collectively by demonstrating that a biologically sustainable fish-
ery could also be a profitable fishery. As has been documented
elsewhere, for example, these eco-accreditation schemes also func-
tion to both commodify certain (measurable) forms of environ-
mental performance and exclude fishermen who do not have the
financial, scientific and institutional supports, or motivations, to
achieve such accreditation (Bresnihan, 2016; Foley & McCay,
2014; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).15
Through her account of the ‘‘will to improve” in Indonesia, Li
(2007) shows how the failure of development projects to achieve
desired outcomes does not necessarily lead to the abandonment
of such projects entirely. Rather, such failures can provide the
impetus for further reflection, data gathering, and analysis that eli-
cit new kinds of governmental intervention. The commitment of
the fisheries managers and scientists in the Irish context to con-
serving lobster stocks and ensuring sustainable livelihoods for
inshore fishermen provides a good example of this ‘‘will to
improve”. Ultimately, the failure of the co-management plan to
materialize after nearly twenty years reinforces (rather than chal-
lenges) the assumption that individual fishers are unable (because
of a lack of appropriate institutional support) to align themselves
with the ‘‘long-term” common good. This can lead to frustration,
cynicism, even exhaustion, on the part of those involved (including
fishermen who are actively involved through the consultation pro-
cess). But it can also lead to a re-doubling of efforts to equip fish-
ermen with the knowledge, security, incentives, and so on, to take
more collective action. As the example of the threat of EU fines and
the promise of an accreditation scheme suggest, diverse tactical
‘levers’ can be used to galvanize ‘‘action on the ground”. Whether
these are territorially defined access rights as developed through
the co-management scheme, eco-accreditation schemes, or more
familiar top-down state regulations (driven by EU environmental
directives), the impetus and effects of these governmental mea-
sures are similar. The motivation is to measurably ‘‘improve” the
interactions between fishers and the fish stocks so that the generic
goals of sustainable development can be advanced. Consistent
with the apolitical rationale of neoliberal governmentality, these
‘‘improvements” are developed without challenging the systemic
drivers of overfishing.5. Conclusion
Efforts to manage the fisheries commons through community-
based institutions represent both continuity with and a novel15 As De Angelis (2013) writes, ‘‘[i]n this way ‘commoning’ is annexed to a divisive,
competitive process in order to keep the whole game going.”departure from liberal forms of government of the past. The conti-
nuity stems from the initial formulation of the problem of overfish-
ing as one of unregulated exploitation of a common resource; the
novelty lies in the critique of existing institutional models, namely
privatization and state regulation, that fail to adequately reflect
and incorporate the capacities of local communities to self-
manage the resources they exploit. An important distinction
between neoliberal fisheries governance today and that of the past
is that the driving impetus behind the design of institutional
boundaries, including those governing access rights, is premised
on enabling the constructive qualities and capacities of individual
resource users working together, rather than simply limiting their
economic self-interest. This in turn opens a more extensive and
malleable terrain for governmental reflection and intervention.
As outlined in section three, the task of creating territorial units
for managing the Irish lobster fisheries was based on the gathering
of data about the socio-economic, geographic, and biological prop-
erties of the fisheries through ten years of inquiry and consultation
between fishermen, fisheries managers, and fisheries scientists.
The motivation for this process was to get the institutions right,
to graft a framework for collective action onto the realities on
the ground such that real, measurable effects would be generated.
Ultimately, no co-management plan has been implemented but
this has not led to the complete abandonment of the plans. As dis-
cussed above, the enforcement of EU biodiversity legislation, as
well as the promise of market-based accreditation schemes, arise
as potentially decisive new interventions for galvanizing fishers
(and the central government) into advancing the co-management
strategy.
Understanding neoliberal governmentality in terms of improve-
ment helps us to understand and take more seriously the genuine
investment of fisheries managers, scientists, and fishermen them-
selves, as they seek to devise better institutional and technical
responses to the problem of overfishing. The concept of improve-
ment works as a productive counterpoint (rather than alternative)
to the more familiar understanding of neoliberalism as enclosure.
Enclosure refers to the regulatory moment, legislative instrument,
or market device, that excludes some and includes others from
access to resources. Often, and understandably, the critical focus
is placed on these points or moments of enclosure and the negative
social (and environmental) effects they can generate. There is less
attention paid in the critical literature, however, on the way enclo-
sures are devised, justified and extended—other than pointing to
neoliberal ‘ideology’. The concept of improvement responds to this
gap by focussing on the technical, scientific, and discursive work
that provides the justification for novel and diverse forms of enclo-
sure. In the case of the Irish lobster fisheries, it is possible to see
how efforts to better understand and coordinate the conduct of
fishermen and the biological dynamics of lobster stocks (within
the limits of the market) gives rise to a ‘‘regime of truth” within
which specific interventions (access rights, enforcement of biodi-
versity legislation, eco-accreditation) and actions (fishermen’s
reluctance to participate) are justified and understood.
As outlined above, the primary goal of the co-management
plans for the Irish inshore fisheries is not to increase the profitabil-
ity of some sections of the industry, nor even to entrain fishermen
to perform in pre-defined ways. The goal is to foster collective
action among specific groups of fishers so they can better manage
specific fish stocks and adapt to the ‘‘world economic climate”. It is
important to emphasize that the ‘failure’ of the co-management
plan is not due to the inflexibility of ‘top-down’ administration
or the inability to incorporate local knowledge and needs. Or
rather, these are challenges that those involved in designing the
co-management scheme are keenly aware of and willing to
address. The weakness (and strength) of the co-management plan
as it has unfolded since the 1990s is that it is resolutely committed
P. Bresnihan /World Development 120 (2019) 210–220 219to galvanizing local, collective action to address systemic, ‘non-
local’ problems that are inseparable from the deepening commod-
ification of the fisheries. Significantly, this effort is not incompati-
ble with ‘positive’ outcomes and solutions. For example, the crab
fishery in Mayo could implement a regulated fishery and achieve
valuable eco-accreditation that in turn could raise the incomes of
the fishermen involved, supporting the sustainability of that com-
munity. And just as the co-management of the Maine lobster fish-
eries are held up as an example of a successful managed commons,
encouraging and driving similar efforts around the world, so too
would a successful eco-accreditation scheme be used as evidence
to extend such initiatives.
Recognizing that neoliberal governmentality is not primarily
driven by capitalist strategies of accumulation (though it may sup-
port them), or generative of only ‘negative’ outcomes, alerts us to
calls that too readily affirm the existence of ‘non-neoliberal’ or
‘non-capitalist’ alternatives in the midst of a monolithic capitalist
system (Gibson-Graham, 2008). As outlined in Section 2, there is
a tendency to identify neoliberal fisheries management in terms
of private property regimes, market rationality, and narrowly
defined economic subjects. This identification gives rise to affirma-
tions of neoliberalism’s ‘other’: the social and ecological relation-
ships, practices and values that are excluded from the narrow
economic calculus of neoliberal governance. One of the conse-
quences of this analysis is that efforts to render these ‘non-
neoliberal’ practices and values visible are generally understood
as a positive step toward diversifying socio-economic strategies
and models of fisheries production, to building alternatives to
neoliberal enclosure and capitalist accumulation. Undoubtedly,
these diverse socio-economic and ecological practices and subjec-
tivities do offer an important counter-point and resistance to indi-
vidual transferable access rights or the pressure to overexploit fish
stocks due to market exposure. But it is also important to identify
how these collective re/productive capacities can also be aligned
with new forms of biopolitical improvement and enclosure that
continue to orientate around the demand for resource-users to
assume more responsibility for managing resources and to devise
strategies for adapting to uncertain economic and environmental
conditions.
In her work on the ‘peri-capitalist’ frontiers of Matsutake mush-
room ecologies and the precarious livelihoods of mushroom pick-
ers, Anna Tsing (2015) shows the multi-form character of global
commodity chains that rely on non-capitalist relations and sites
of re/production—what she calls the ‘‘latent commons”. From this
perspective, capital does not simply enclose the commons through
privatization (‘accumulation by dispossession’) but appropriates
the commons from a distance, rendering it a kind of infrastructure
for the ‘productive’ economy (see Moore, 2015).16 The imperfect,
fragile and ad hoc nature of the latent (mushroom) commons she
describes corresponds closely with the ‘‘unregulated” (fisheries)
commons that fishermen like Joe are a part of. Similar to the precar-
ious lives of the mushroom pickers, Joe and other inshore fishermen
are caught between localized, situated economies and ecologies that
rely on relationships of reciprocity and care, and the need to remain
commercially viable when operating at the bottom of a competitive,
high-value commodity chain. Efforts to institutionalize the commons
as a form of community-managed resource seek to resolve these
deep-rooted tensions by encouraging and enabling collective action.
This can involve the fostering of social norms, diverse economic
practices, and local knowledge, qualities that are not familiarly
understood as either ‘neoliberal’ or ‘capitalist’. Critical scholars need16 This echoes what feminist scholars have argued for several decades in relation to
social reproduction more generally, namely the historic ambivalence of the commons
as both a site for non-capitalist relations of re/production, and a site of ‘free
(unwaged) labor appropriated by capital (Federici, 2011).’to be cautious of positions that too equate neoliberal governance
with ‘simplification’, with the resulting call to include more social
and ecological diversity and capacity, potentially driving further
rounds of improvement and enclosure. Similarly, criticisms of the
bureaucratic, ‘top-down’ nature of environmental management are
immanent to neoliberal governmentality, energizing new efforts to
galvanize local resource-users to take more initiative. This article
has contributed to debates on the relationship between neoliberal-
ism and the commons by troubling any neat distinctions between
‘good’ (i.e., ‘non-neoliberal’) and ‘bad’ (i.e., ‘neoliberal’) versions of
the institutional commons. By emphasizing the ambivalent role
and value of the commons within dynamic forms of neoliberal gov-
ernance today, this article argues for greater criticality when it
comes to affirming the benefits of the commons as an alternative
to dominant forms of economic production and decision-making.References
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